Guarantees (In)security for Ukraine. Sokolova, KLIKİN. Free Space at @ProUA

[music] One. Friends, hello. My name is Yanina Sokolova. Today we have gathered to discuss an important issue that I am sure is being discussed in your kitchens. And in fact, it has been in the air for the past few days and even weeks, but it became more crystallized during the meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and European leaders in Washington.

However, it has not completely crystallized, at a stage of crystallization, but not final, because it is not completely clear what these security guarantees will be. What security guarantees would we like to see for Ukraine? We are talking today about distinguished guests nearby.

Pavlo Klimkin will join us. It literally arrives live in a few minutes. Serhiy Sumlenny, German political scientist, director of the European Sustainability Initiative Center. Sergey, now I'm officially saying hello to you on camera.

Oleksandr Krayev, expert at the Foreign Policy Council Ukrainian Prism. Congratulations, Alexander. And Oleksandr Khara will be online with us, diplomat, director of the Center for Defense Strategies.

Why did we start talking about this today? You say, Yanina, maybe someone will say it's too early, nothing is known yet, but the info drive really is there. A senior Pentagon official told a small group of allies that the United States plans to play a minimal role in future security guarantees for Ukraine.

The entire burden falls on Europe. Europe will have to take on more responsibility. Politico already writes about this. According to journalists, European allies are currently somewhat confused by the contradictory statements of Trump and what was happening in Washington in high offices with what they came out of there.

In particular, the decision not to deploy US troops in Ukraine was finally announced during a large meeting at the White House. Meanwhile, the New York Times says that at the time of the release of our video, which you are watching now, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is holding meetings with national security advisers of EU countries regarding security guarantees for Ukraine.

It was he who Trump tasked Mark Rubio with balancing the positions of the US, Europe, and Kyiv on this issue. And Zelensky answered what security guarantees Ukraine can realistically receive.

He noted that Kyiv received a positive signal from Trump, saying that his country would be a participant in these guarantees. Regarding European states, the President of Ukraine noted: "We know that there are 30 countries in the coalition of the willing that are potentially considering their participation in security guarantees." Someone can be boots on the ground, someone is ready to provide air defense, someone can, like, help us with land, someone can provide guarantees of security in the air.

Someone will cover the sky or do some sky patrol for a while, in the appropriate aircraft in the appropriate number. Someone, I am sure, will be ready only for funding, not for direct participation, because they have neutrality or another status in their constitution.

According to him, it is important that there are countries that are ready to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. And among them, in particular, in addition to Europe, the united coalition of the willing that you saw in Washington, there are also Japan and Australia.

Well, further on, Jedi Vance declares that this is not our war at all. Europe is next, so let Europe sort it out. Today we will discuss, you express your thoughts, as you wish, as you think, what security guarantees for Ukraine could be, which, in your opinion, could indicate that these monsters will not be able to attack us in the future, because they will simply be afraid, if they do not attack, for example, Finland, well, which is already in NATO, but was not in NATO before.

Well, here's a different story about their love for us and the reasons. First of all, reasons. This is not a NATO issue. You understand this perfectly well, but I ask you to vote, please.

Security guarantees for Ukraine can be accession to NATO, support from Western partners, total militarization of Ukraine, or your own version, you can write it in the comments. Well, I'll ask my distinguished guests the first question.

What did you basically take away from the option of security guarantees announced at the table between the Europeans, Trump, and Zelensky? It seems to me that the main person who mentioned these guarantees, besides thanking her tenfold and thanking her for meeting and agreeing to negotiate, was Ms. Maloni, the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of Italy, where she said that let's still talk about security guarantees.

They should be unprecedented and similar to Article 5 of NATO, NATO unification, without Ukraine joining NATO. I'll tell you right away, we have this option of joining NATO, but Trump said: "That's it, you can not talk about it, it will not happen," Trump said.

You have the floor to express your thoughts on this. Maybe it's not final? Well, if you allow me, I'll begin. I think I'll start with the most understandable and common.

Anything that is called the same as NATO, but not NATO, is already profanation. That's what it's not NATO, right? Because, well, it's a simulator, as Foucault called it. We reproduce a concept within another concept.

That is, we will invent something invented again. Why? That's how a large NATO state, especially if we're talking about nuclear ones, would be ready to provide something similar to someone outside the alliance without the same guarantees, without a history of cooperation, without anything. So I don't really believe in it.

With all due respect to Ms. Meloni, all the support, the way she fights for us in the Italian Senate and generally fights the Italian system, it is very difficult to imagine that everyone else will follow the same pattern. The scheme proposed by the Coalition of the Determined seemed more workable, that is, a peacekeeping one, conditionally called a peacekeeping end, Alexander, they are willing now.

They're like, oh yeah, that's a valid point. And so when they proposed a military contingent in key cities, at key points, which should deter Russia from strikes, but here too we have a problem, because the British and French, who actually brought up this idea, who started talking about it, the British are now swaying just like Trump. Either that, or the instructors, or just the sky defense, or 30,000, as Gili said last time, or the instructors again, and the French are simply not responding.

That is, everything that is going around, let's say, like NATO, but not NATO without joining NATO, it doesn't seem real to me, it doesn't seem promising. This is the really political part of this agreement.

Anything that concerns the actual placement of people here, the actual inclusion of us in the missile defense system, the actual continuation of full-fledged weapons support, this looks like a plan, this looks like a strategy, but it is only partially discussed. That is, Germany is conditionally making the proposal, and let's close the sky.

The proposal is made conditionally by what Bloomberg says, 10 countries that do not want to be named are ready to provide contingents. So why aren't you ready to name yourselves, gentlemen? But here's the thing, there's a part here, there's a part here.

We don't have a unified, real strategy. And, unfortunately, this is the key conclusion that can be drawn. There is a desire, there are completely different visions, but there is no common strategy.

Therefore, for now, it is very difficult to talk about any real approach to these guarantees. And Trump expresses exactly the same thoughts. Do you remember, after meeting with Putin, he said: "Wait for the guarantees, you will meet with Putin, you will talk and everything will be clear there, it will still be wonderful.

Putin and Zelensky will meet, and then I will come and in general we will sign everything and it will be beautiful." At the meeting with the Europeans, suddenly for everyone, you saw Hexit's face at that moment, he says: "30 Americans will be in Ukraine. There is shock, trepidation, horror.

The next day, the Pentagon comes out and says: "We did n't plan there." And the state department says: "We want intelligence, we want weapons, we want to create a logistics hub in Transcarpathia." But everything else is not our business. That is, unfortunately, to directly answer your question, Nino, firstly, I don't really believe in what is called NATO outside of NATO, and secondly, unfortunately, there is no common strategy yet, although the situation is much better than a year ago, when they were simply afraid to talk about it.

Yes, that's true, Serhiy. Well, by the way, I need to friends, I will note that Serhiy Sumleny, a German political scientist, director of the European Resilience initiative center. By the way, regarding the Germans, well, we must pay tribute to, uh, Merz and his positions, and his decisions regarding providing one or another weapon.

We have significantly improved, well, at least it looks like this, our cooperation and intentions. They are quite decisive, understanding the danger. Am I wrong? Well, I would like to believe you, let's say so.

I would like to agree with you. A person who knows the Germans well and worked there. says: "I would like to believe you." Uh, yes. Well, look, uh, as for NATO, but not NATO.

I cannot agree that this makes absolutely no sense, because not because I believe in such a concept, but because I will remind you that NATO, as a defense alliance, worked only once, when Al-Qaeda, so, committed a terrorist attack in New York. And the only time military assistance was provided by the most powerful army in the world to the United States in order to, so, chase Osama bin Laden around Kandahar, or wherever he was, and as a result lose this war.

In fact, the Taliban will lose it as a result. That is, I can imagine that Ukraine will be given guarantees, like in NATO, more or less by individual states, but these guarantees do not guarantee anything. If you read Article 5 of the NATO charter, you know that the country that was attacked has the right to convene a meeting.

And at this meeting, it means that other countries will understand and, therefore, agree that they will provide some assistance. Conditionally speaking, Germany will want to provide Ukraine with 5,000 helmets when, it means, the war starts again.

Here you will have 5,000 helmets. Wait, Sergey. Yes, this is not regulated? No. No. And what is the participation of the coalition? Maybe they can pray. They can pray.

So, then, uh, we are talking about what security guarantees are anyway? So what are security guarantees and how can you use them? what are we we will not be left alone, as it was in 22 and 14, when the Russian Federation wants to attack again, and it clearly wants to do it. Here I would like to emphasize a few points.

First, the security guarantees that are being discussed will be considered only after the end of the hot phase of the war. What do you call it? That's what will happen? Because everything else is not security guarantees, everything else is direct participation in the war.

And if we are talking about security guarantees, then their discussion and practical implementation is realistic from the point of view of European governments only after a certain truce has been reached, which in the conditions of Moscow's demands for Ukraine is Ukrainian capitulation. Then I ask for your forgiveness for saying unpleasant things here.

And, so, then we conclude, so, there are certain conditions in this constitution, a certain agreement on security guarantees. What does it provide for? It obviously does not provide for any automation, any automatic is an automatic reaction of Western states to some Russian actions.

Because no one will agree to this. Conditionally speaking, if the Russians shell Zaporizhia, then Germany undertakes to hit the Taurus there with missiles from the Kursk nuclear power plant. Well, there will be no such thing.

Or there, I don't know, there will be no such thing from some base in Kronstadt. That is, there will be some expanded package of promises there of military-technical cooperation, provision of political assistance there at international forums and so on, and so on. And it is obvious that since no country gives up its sovereignty in the military, primarily the military sphere, there will be no automatic involvement of the military of Western states in these actions.

And of course, it is possible to collect certain types of our own, for example, to create legal grounds for military-technical cooperation, the provision of weapons and so on, and so on. As, for example, Israel did in expanded cooperation with the United States, after which there Israel was given weapons, and as a priority, and then the sky was closed, and so on.

But this is not automatic. That is what, in my opinion, is one of the most dangerous, if not poisoned pills for Ukraine in this format of negotiations, is the deployment of contingents in Ukraine. And why? Because I do not believe that Western contingents, if they are deployed along the entire 2,500-kilometer front line with Russia, either the current front line or the potential front line, that these continents, firstly, will be able to provide a decisive rebuff to Russia if aggression is carried out again.

Secondly, they will want to provide this rebuff at all. And thirdly, what function will they perform there. That is what function will they perform there, and all the German, uh, security experts, with whom I spoke about this topic, they are convinced that these will be police forces that will monitor.

Well, it's like OSCE or something? That they should monitor the ceasefire. And they will be standing only on the Ukrainian-controlled side, not on the side controlled by the Russian Federation. And what will happen on the other side, no one knows.

Next. So we imagine that there are Russian occupation troops there, they shelled some village there in some zone 3 km from this contact line. Uh-huh.

And that a German battalion will shoot at Russians? No. What will they do? They will probably go there, record it, send a report and, probably, after that they will write that they are asking for redeployment somewhere deep inside. That is why this topic is very ugly.

[music] So what can really be effective security guarantees for Ukraine? These are, of course, agreements on military and military-technical cooperation, the placement in Ukraine of its own weapons production under licenses and the maximum transfer to Ukraine those weapons that Ukraine can sovereignly decide to use over long distances on the sovereign territory of the Russian Federation. This will really increase Ukraine's defense capability.

Everything else, and Russia knows this, is that all these promises are only worth it while there is peace. As soon as a war begins, every state begins to worry about its security.

The Russians know how to threaten, they know how to buy politicians from politicians and will take full advantage of this. There are comments from our viewers on our broadcast.

Desert Ghost writes that there is no alternative to joining NATO. Moreover, integration into NATO is enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. So, this should be a priority in the mouth of the president in any negotiations on security guarantees.

plus competitive and progressive development of its own military-industrial complex with the ability not only to defend itself, but also to offer to purchase Ukrainian weapons. Well, I mean our ally.

I ask you, Oleksandr, eh, what do you think, why is this such a simple question in reality. Why don't we tell them Do we need to join NATO? Why does Finland, which has a large border with Russia right next door, need it, but we don't? Because it poses an existential question to NATO, which, in principle, calls into question the entire existence of NATO. Well, what my colleague correctly said about the fifth article, I will clarify that the convening of this council is the fourth article, that consultations can begin.

The fifth article says even more simply that an attack on one is considered, here's the key word, is considered an attack on all, which will prohibit Mr. Orban from leaving the press conference on the very first day and saying: "Well, officially Russia attacked us, but I called Putin and everything is fine.

Now Russian troops may be on our territory. We won't ban anything, we won't do anything, and so on." What was, let's say, the problem with Finland and Sweden? They weren't under direct attack. Yes, it was a provocation, if NATO went for this, well, as they called it, a deliberate provocation.

They did it very right. They showed Russia that we can get closer to you, do whatever you want. And there was a very important aspect there. For that transitional period, while all the parliaments there, remember, the Turkish and Hungarian ones, voted for their accession for a long time.

For this interim period, Britain and the USA provided Finland and Sweden with interim guarantees at the level of article number five. And that was the moment when Putin, who had previously given the propagandists the order to talk about Borholm, and about missiles covering the entire Baltic Sea, and about the destroyed Stockholm.

There were such cries there, troops were being moved. At that moment, Putin was like: "Yes, and we never had any questions. These are independent states with their own policies.

How can we? We are Russia, we respect international law. How can we? How could you think that something would go wrong with us? By the way, by the way, those are the same words. He also spoke about Ukraine in the early 2000s.

Simply, Alexander, word for word. Yes, wherever he wants, they enter. Not a sovereign state, you know our attitude. Welcome.

Yes. And why change the Rover if it's moving? Do you understand? Well, everyone supposedly believes it. So, if we accept Ukraine, it turns out that, continuing what Kole said, article number five should apply immediately.

And the question immediately arises. So, if Ukraine is already part of us, it has been attacked, even post-facto, but the attack continues, then we have all been attacked. We have to react, is there a guarantee that they will react? And then the key question for NATO arises: why does it exist? That is, in fact, this is the well-known American strategy regarding Taiwan, the so-called strategic uncertainty.

Well, when they say that Taiwan, if we recognize one China, then Taiwan is part of China, but if you want to review the status of Taiwan, we will defend it. And no one knows which part of this phrase the Americans will actually follow.

And they have been pursuing this strategy of strategic uncertainty, I apologize for the tautology, for more than 50 years. In essence, article number five is about the same thing.

It really worked once, several times it didn't work. Well, let's say Portugal will clearly tell you that the seizure was a YEAR ago, when article number five should have been applied. But the States will say otherwise.

Yes, well, Portugal constitutionally considered it part of Portugal. They told her no, this is your colony, so let's not do anything. But, yes, the real issue is that they are either afraid, or unwilling, or unsure of checking the validity of their own key guarantee, because it poses for them, well, a key question about the existence of the alliance itself.

I think that in addition to this, there is probably also the issue of them having to rely not only on fragmented supplies of money and weapons, but also on the army. The NATO charter includes an option for an ally's army to come to the defense of a country that finds itself at war.

There is such a broad definition that each country can do what it considers sufficient to resist this aggression. Well, that is, if they don't want to conditionally, if they don't want to send a contingent, then they don't need to, they don't have to, as Serhiy said, they can already make a mistake.

That is, they must consider options for help. And what I really wanted to agree with is that there seems to be no certainty about what the goals of Western countries are in this war. First, are they even participating in this war, because from Moscow's point of view, Moscow is fighting both against Germany and against the United States, despite all its friendship with Trump, against other countries.

But Western countries have not decided whether they will participate in this war. Most likely, they think not. Second, what is the desired end to this war? With the end of the hot phase, or the defeat of Russia, or something else? And so, if you don't have a clearly defined goal, that this war must end with the defeat of Russia and the victory of Ukraine, then your entire chain of steps, which you are taking to help Ukraine within the framework of these security guarantees, will fall apart, because you will be helping Ukraine.

You will help Ukraine in the diplomatic field, in the field of finding compromises, in the field, perhaps, of air defense, but not in finding sore points in the Russian economy, destroying its refineries, destroying its logistics, that is, logistical homogeneity, and leading to Russia's strategic defeat. Because the strategic defeat of Russia is actually more terrible for you than the defeat of Ukraine, because Ukraine will disappear, okay, it happens, Russia will disappear, the world will disappear.

This is how it looks from the point of view of the Western military alliance. And let me just make a short remark. We just need to remember when NATO emerged and from whom it emerged.

We have people from countries that survived the horrors of World War II and wrote this text, relatively speaking, believing that they will always be equally understanding of the obligation to warn any aggressor against aggression. It's the same as the UN, just a little more focused on the defense sector, when everyone believed that everything would be fine in principle, everyone would love and understand each other, and even if a conditional Trump or whoever appeared, it wouldn't matter, well, he would have the great responsibility of the United States' Grand Strategy in mind.

and he will not back down from this. Times have changed a bit. Well, Pavlo Klimkin joined us. Diplomat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for 14-1 years. Who held you hostage, Pavel? But they were good people.

I hope so. Didn't they hurt you? No, on the contrary, we had serious matters to attend to. Or so it seems to me. I understand.

We are also seriously, or so it seems to us, discussing the issue of warranty here. We have a question for the audience. Ukraine's security guarantees may include NATO membership, support from Western partners, and total militarization.

And here, while you were driving, people were excited that you would join us, asking all of you. Please ask Pavlo, do we really need this NATO and what is Trump's real position? Well, if it was scanned while he was out in public, over the last two weeks, what is his position? Can you voice it? I, madam, am being sneaky, but, well, I probably still can, since they are open, your aphoisms. I am reading.

Yes, let me return it so that you are better off. There are different ones, and one of them has been afraid of wolves all his life, a sheep or a wolf, and a shepherd. This goes back to the previous quote about Western countries that don't articulate their goals, not exactly clear ones, but they're not stupid.

Well, whoever formulates the goals must adhere to them, then it becomes part of your political and other duty. What if it doesn't work out? What if you need to work for that? And what if you have to lose something to do that? Therefore, in today's Western reality, it is structured in such a way that no one will define clear goals.

You will be told the right words. I also claim to know how to rearrange words and sentences about strategic uncertainty. But today's Europe has neither the political will nor the political culture to define its goals, unlike those in our war with Russia.

This is the first. Secondly, we don't know what will happen to NATO. Maybe NATO will be so cool that NATO will become some kind of defense and security reality for a significant part of the world. Maybe NATO will go into several different stories.

Maybe NATO will actually reboot. Maybe NATO will say: " We've already done everything in the Atlantic, we just need to clean up Russia a little bit here, and then we'll go to the Pacific Ocean." And this is our task until the end of the 20th century. But everything you do here, well, let Europe play around with it.

I'm joking, of course, but every joke, you understand, has its own share. First, in today's NATO reality, not only Trump, but a significant, if I may say so carefully so as not to offend anyone, majority of Europeans do not have the will to move towards NATO with us and do not have the will to move towards NATO with anyone else. We are not the only ones who want to join NATO.

For example, the non-trivial Chudik, I like him for some reason. Well, the president of Argentina is worried. He keeps saying, "Argentina wants to join NATO.

That's my goal. Where am I?" In Brazil, they gave some unknown status to someone unknown, about whom we once said: "Argentina, I want normal status, I want to be, I will protect you." And what? Ugh. It is not entirely clear how this will turn out for the Britons, but the story is funny, if we are being completely serious.

Of course, we need NATO. And why do we say so super super seriously, not just insistently, super seriously, that we cannot limit ourselves? This is not just about NATO, it's about our sovereignty. It's about what we can and can't do.

How can your aphorism be spread throughout Europe? I can, of course, paraphrase it in obscene words, but let's paraphrase it. Yes.

No, we are still polite people. Polite people, yes, but we cannot limit ourselves to something that limits us as a country and as a nation. If Trump wants to say that he is not taking us into NATO yet, that is Trump's right.

We can talk to him, but we can't convince him. And maybe we can convince them, let's take a look. Do you really think there is still a chance to convince? Absolutely. Absolutely.

This is not a deranged character. But you know what I like about Trump? I'm even sometimes accused of liking Trump. I'm not a fan of many of his policies, but I support some with both hands.

And what I support is that he is not politically correct. He goes like this and says: "What are you doing there?" And I'll look at it this way. Everyone tells him: "This can't be, Mr.

President." He says, "What are you telling me? My instincts are telling me this." And if he does it like that, then it has no consistency. That's the problem.

You know, there's this famous phrase: "Well, the only difference between a nutcase and a Gini is whether he's successful or not, or whether she's successful, right?" Accordingly, NATO is a serious story. There is no replacement for NATO yet.

NATO does not mean, neither Article 5 nor Article 4, which provides for consultations, that everyone immediately rushes west to defend the one who was attacked. If you read Article 5 literally, each ally decides for itself how it helps, but in reality, within NATO there are procedures and what you will do.

And in fact, by being in NATO, you agree to this. now, and now to such a liner, because I liked it just aphasm, yes, a cool impersonal digression like that. Well, for example, this thesis about the fifth article is beyond the scope of this article.

I don't know what to eat and drink with it. I basically don't know what this could mean. I've been working with security there for, well, basically, many years. I understand what Article Five means within NATO.

And I don't understand at all, I told this to the Italians, there are a lot of them there, we talked to them, they say: "Let's mix something up creatively." I say: "Great, it's ready right away, let's go." But what is Article Five outside of NATO? I don't understand in principle. This is some kind of positive schizophrenia for me.

Now, what do we need for what we call minimum security guarantees? Not security obligations, guarantees. First, we need a legal framework.

If this is not a NATO framework, we need an agreement with the States. And we need an agreement either separately with European countries or with the EU. If this is an agreement, it needs to be signed, presented beautifully, like Trump, and then taken to the Senate and Congress.

Getting votes there, even among Republicans, whom Trump controls, will be non-trivial. I can tell you this from the mood I feel. I don't feel everyone.

I don't talk to everyone there. And from what I feel, this is a non-trivial task. In Europe, if Trump doesn't sign it, they will go into a trance. That is, they never ratify.

Even if Macron says: "Well, I'm here, I have the political will, I signed." Well, they will tell Mr. President: "Okay." That is, this will not happen in Europe.

What then? If it were just an American story and Europeans would still fall into a trance, but a story like South Korea or Japan, it would be okay. Even if the Americans are not physically present on our soil, they support intelligence, air, space, okay, logistics, and the Europeans do here.

The second component is security. Not just military, I emphasize, security, do you understand the difference between the two words? Ugh. And financial support for us.

This means not only the Armed Forces, the military-industrial complex. Well, who will support the army with our budget? Do you know how much of Israel's GDP was spent on defense? It decreased from 55 to 5%. We can endure.

We're counting on models now, I just won't say. These are our Ukrainian centers. They say that we don't mess around with less than 12-15%. Can you imagine Ukraine, which currently holds 15%.

Even those who have never done budget planning. But now the third story is the presence of at least someone on our territory. I'm not talking about being close to the front line.

Okay, forgot. And what does it give? This makes it possible to contain and protect part of the critical infrastructure on our territory. Yes.

Ugh. Even if their presence is very limited, they will protect critical infrastructure, and someone, if we decide, will protect the line. Well, for example, I don't want to offend anyone, the Chinese, the Indians, well, the Indians have to make amends for buying Russian peacekeepers and sending us peacekeepers and saying: "Ukrainians, we're sad, but that was history.

Biden set us up. Damn, now you can conveniently send everything there." Yes. No, that's what they say. Absolutely publicly.

Here we are, peacekeepers who will guard, we will say: "Okay, great, you have experience" and so on. But the part of the components that is further away protects critical infrastructure and is supported by the Americans.

How is the air there going now, by the way, a serious discussion, there are interesting nuances. Well, without these three components, it's impossible to even talk about proper security obligations, what in such funny English is called commitments. Ugh.

Well, it doesn't have to be like that at all. And in my opinion, the ticket to any negotiations, even those that will be difficult and painful for us, is through this security logic. We always talk about a peace that is just and sustainable.

Unfortunately, I forgot about the fair one. Well, honestly, it's true. Well, no one is talking about a just peace in these negotiations. Well, why did you forget? Are you talking about the Ukrainian side or the Europeans now? As? No, no.

Well, not about us. Obviously, we haven't forgotten. No, about Europeans. Europeans say that a just peace is needed. Not as often as before, of course, but they talk about what Ukraine has written in its constitution.

These are all territories, so we definitely won't give them away or exchange them. No, no, I'm talking about justice in a broad sense. Justice in the sense of who is guilty, who will suffer the punishment for it, what punishment.

Understood. Americans don't talk about this. Pavle, we have Oleksandr Khara waiting for us. Let's give him the floor now and come back. Do we have Alexander Khara? E.

Alexander, you have already waited, you did not fall asleep there, and that is very good. It was interesting to hear from this esteemed audience. It's very nice that I actually can't add much, except for the details of these, let's say.

Alexander, I'll introduce you to Alexander, forgive me for interrupting you. I will introduce the audience to you who are not in the know. Oleksandr Khara, diplomat, director of the Center for Defense Strategies.

Dad, you have a word. Thank you. Well, I would add a little. Firstly, indeed, the fifth article is not automatic. And there is a history of this, when there was the first draft of the Washington Treaty, Congress said it wouldn't pass because only Congress could make decisions about war and peace.

And it is impossible to give such a right not only to the President of the United States, but even more so to allies. Especially since this would mean, well, actually the beginning of a conflict with a high probability that would escalate into a nuclear conflict.

The second point, it seems to me that all this, I would call it a delusion about security guarantees from our partners, is connected with the false impression that this war can end. Uh, and in order for Ukraine to accept this bitter pill of giving up its territories, limiting its sovereignty, please, we will give you some guarantees.

Well, if the Russian Federation is nominally, well, it is the largest nuclear power with strategic warheads and delivery vehicles as many as the Americans, but it has much more tactical nuclear weapons than the Americans. The second point is that it is much larger in demographic and higher parameters.

And in order for Ukraine to deter the Russian Federation, we need to We have several options. The first is sovereign nuclear weapons. Plus, of course, the so-called triad, that is, the air component, the ground component, and the underwater component.

If we look at our geography, our proximity to the Russian Federation, the fact that all of Ukraine is being shot at, there are big questions: how can we ensure the safety and integrity of these nuclear facilities in the event of an attack on Ukraine? I'm not talking about the marine component. The Black Sea is actually a swamp and it is difficult to hide anything there.

Moreover, Crimea has not been liberated yet, so this is not an option for us yet. Of course, there would be an option, which is expanded NATO defense, that is, American nuclear bombs on the territory of Ukraine, which could be used in the event of an attack. Well, it's clear that our partners are not ready to do that right now.

I don't know when they will be ready. The next option is collective security. And why was NATO created? An attack on one country is seen as an attack on the entire organization. It's clear that Trump doesn't want this.

I absolutely agree with Pavel that this is a theoretical and hypothetical possibility, because it really is not foreseen and maybe he will realize in a year, maybe that the Russian Federation is not a friend, it is a rival, an adversary, that it needs to be dealt with more harshly, that the loss of Ukraine and the vulnerability of Europeans is bad for the United States in general and for its strategy in the Indo-Pacific region in particular. And then we need to solve the Russian problem in some other way than making peace with Putin.

That is, theoretically it is possible, but it still seems too far in history. Thank you. Thank you. Therefore, there is nothing else for Ukraine except NATO membership.

And from a deterrence perspective, these are also very important points. What our partners are currently discussing is important. And we, of course, thank them, because they are not obliged to help us, they are not our formal allies.

There are two types of containment. Restraint with punishment. Relatively speaking, Russia knows that it can invade our territory, but it is unable to achieve its military goals and the price is too high to continue the conflict. This is what we should strive for.

This, I would say, is the first step for us and our security in the future. The second part is deterrence by prohibition. Deterrence by den.

This means, and this, by the way, is very important, that this is more of a psychological moment than the hardware there or the skill of our military. That is, so that the Russians know that any, any aggression against Ukraine will have absolutely unacceptable consequences and they will not be able to achieve anything.

Of course, nuclear weapons or hypersonic weapons or a combination of other means are what could give us the opportunity to deter Russia in the future. Although, well, you see, in 1922 it was a completely irrational decision to openly attack Ukraine.

Well, and, of course, these are negative consequences for Russia, which they will have to deal with for several more decades. Therefore, what is happening now is positive, because it is a shift, an awareness by our partners that Ukraine is an important security factor.

It is very good that at the Haiti Summit they decided not only to increase their own defense spending, but also to include aid to Ukraine in their budgets for at least 10 years. It is very good that in political statements, both on the eve of the Valaska summit and later, it is stated that the future security of Europe depends on peace in Ukraine or the resolution of this war.

That is, in the 11th year of Russia's war against Ukraine, they finally realized that this war is not about some eastern territories or the statehood of Ukraine, but rather a war against the West and the borders of Europe directly. Alexander, thank you.

Thank you very much, thank you very much for joining. Oleksandr Khara, diplomat, director of the Center for Defense Strategies. I'll show you one video now, and then you'll understand why.

And then we will discuss and summarize. In short, this video is about a political scientist. In general, it's not my policy to show all these liberal Russian media outlets, but when I saw this video, I decided that when I meet with you, we will discuss it. In this video, political scientist Pastukhov.

And he, well, it's clear that he's a liberal, a good Russian, that's for sure. He ponders the consequences of the decisions that may be made in Washington. How will Putin behave? Let's look at this fragment.

If the demand for peace breaks down, war accelerates and becomes more brutal. This means that if nothing is achieved with the exit now, then we will get a certain phase of escalation, in which Putin will be put, perhaps, in a very difficult position. This provision consists in the fact that he will not have any real answers, except for nuclear ones.

That is, it may turn out that the pressure exerted by Ukraine, this huge, powerful, multimillion-dollar ITD Russia, will not be able to say anything about the rail war from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. And then the question arises, if, conditionally speaking, there are some people who understand that if they lose, then the fact that they will be deprived of their freedom and property is the best thing that can happen to them.

And at the same time, they have the option, conditionally speaking, to repeat the fate of some Milosevic or to blow up this planet to the devil's mother, so that she does not suffer. What option will they choose? Everyone says they won't risk it.

And why? Do you doubt? No. Well, look, first of all, all these ideas about not giving it because for Putin this will be the last straw and he will press the red button. This is Elon Musk's rhetoric.

Elon Musk said that he and Trump want to stop World War III because they are really going to explode with a nuclear bomb. Well, we hear it, you know, I heard it for the first time.

Minister Pavlo, I think he heard this before, because he was doing this professionally. But I remember that when they started not giving visas to Russians, Dmitry Medvedev threatened with nuclear weapons because someone had something confiscated and an official was not given a visa. Hey, the Russians threaten with nuclear weapons whenever they don't like something and they think they can intimidate in this way.

The fact that this thesis is being thrown around through very different channels, from Medvedev's alcoholized Telegram channel to, well, Lavrov and liberal Russians, and actually to Russia experts in Germany, is because it's a constant topic of whether this will lead to nuclear war. Scholz argued that he was not giving the BB Marder to Ukraine because it would mean a nuclear war would begin.

After that, everyone in Berlin joked that Marder had the undocumented ability to start a nuclear war just by driving on Ukrainian roads. Here because here I don't think it's worth taking into account at all.

Could Russia start a nuclear war if the Russian leadership sees that they are on the verge of strategic defeat? Theoretically yes. And what should they be given to win? So where would you be better off? Here is Ms.

Yanino in a Russian torture chamber on Khreshchatyk, which will be set up here, probably in this very studio, or so under a Russian nuclear charge, the probability of which has not yet been proven. First, it is unclear whether it will take off, it is unclear whether an order will be given, it is unclear whether it will take off, it is unclear where it will take off, because the Russian, uh, concept of escalation through de-escalation through escalation involves, uh, including a nuclear strike on some uninhabited territories.

They will probably hit their new land, or bomb Voronezh. So I would n't talk about these fears at all here. That's what I think is very important to emphasize, what Mr.

Pavlo said, that we need to involve, we need to take what we can from the West and involve it now, without waiting for this truce, capitulation, and so on. They can, they will agree, uh, patrol a 50 km strip east of the Polish border with planes.

Let them patrol. They can station their air defense crews near Ukrainian nuclear power plants. Let them say, uh, you have to take everything you can get. Agreeing to guarantees instead of militarization is not.

Agree to give up control over Ukrainian territories? No. And then we'll talk further, in 10 years something will happen. Thank you.

Thank you. I really like this position of Ukrainians. She is beautiful, quite optimistic. Maybe it won't take off, well, maybe it's there at all. Or maybe it's the German position.

This is German. Well, I mean about us, it's unknown what condition it's in, so hoping that it might not, I don't really understand this story at all. Well, tell me, what for? Well, launch a nuclear strike and what is that supposed to achieve? There will be panic, obviously, meaning there will be no military results.

There will be total panic, but the panic will be global. Ugh. Some good Russian acquaintances, good at pubs, for example, the Chinese, will also have questions. Ugh.

And these issues will no longer be the ones they will discuss in the Politburo, but where the Politburo needs to make a decision. And what exactly can be achieved by using tactical nuclear weapons? how to break through the front, and then the consequences of radiation, the consequences of everything.

Despite the fact that Moscow constantly claims that this is supposedly Russian land with Russians there, so be it. What's next? Well, they are also hitting this land now.

I really don't understand the completely different logic. But what challenges are they going to respond to with a nuclear strike and what will they achieve? When the Americans went there in 1922, Burns, and then they came and said about the possible use of nuclear weapons, there was modeling there. I say: "Well, tell me what is the option that would give Russia opportunities and benefits, while limiting all their negative consequences.

And so far, no one has found such an option. Yes, theoretically there is such an opportunity. So what then? So when everyone starts rolling their eyes like this and saying: "Well, that's it, Putin will strike nuclear weapons." I say: "Well, tell me what for? So what will it be? Panic, right? But then, after a nuclear strike, several million Ukrainians, who are ready to go to the end, will no longer have any restrictions, neither moral nor otherwise. Yes.

And this war will turn into a war without any rules. Do you understand what this will mean? Ugh. That's why I think that all these rants are: " Let's bang someone, let's protest." I don't rule it out. I don't know what's going on in the minds of the people who are there until the end, I do n't know, but I'm very wary of everyone starting to literally fall into a trap and say: "Well, a nuclear strike, that's it, the end.

Come on, let's give in to everything and everything." By the way, I think Trump feels a little better about this. Although he doesn't want to start a third world war.

Yes, he said a couple of times that as soon as he was asked about the atomic bomb, he said: "No, we won't talk about it, it won't happen, it's not necessary." Although he is less talkative about it. But essentially, this is what my colleagues said.

The Russians just see that it works. As soon as they mention nuclear weapons, everyone starts to get scared, at least think about it, at least slow down with deliveries, support for the decision, whatever. As long as it works, the Russians use it.

The Russians have a very old saying that nuclear weapons are not designed to be used. But you can threaten her almost endlessly. Therefore, there is one positive point where I want to put three dots.

If the Russians again reach the nuclear weapons argument, all others end accordingly, which means they have almost warmed up to normal negotiations. If they start threatening this again, it means that somewhere there is already an understanding that there is nothing left.

I'm afraid that's too optimistic, but otherwise I agree. Thank you. Thank you very much for coming today and for the conversation. Friends, we had a survey, we have the results.

Well, we asked you, can total militarization be a guarantee of security for Ukrainians? By the way, I'm surprised that you didn't vote for NATO accession, but rather for this item, which won 56%. That is, to totally militarize Ukraine.

NATO accession 30%, support for Western partners 13%. I have it on my YouTube now, because this broadcast is on two channels at once. And the results: NATO accession 39%, total militarization - 47%, support for Western partners - 11.

That is, the majority of Ukrainians support the total militarization of Ukraine. Friends, I just want to say that this is a bit of schizophrenia. The total militarization of Ukraine is possible only with the consent and support of our Western partners, since we cannot totally militarize the economy on our own.

We can only do this given this support. I mean, Pavle, I mean fragmentarily, that is, they give us something, but we are raking it up here totally, on which you just saw this broadcast. ProuA channel of Yanina Sokolova.