In the United States, a working group dedicated to developing strategies to pressure Russia has been disbanded: what lies behind this decision and what are the consequences
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump recently took an unexpected step — the interagency working group established to develop effective strategies to pressure the Russian Federation was closed. This was an unforeseen development, considering that this structure was supposed to work on initiatives that could accelerate the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine and strengthen the U.S. position on international security issues. According to information disclosed by sources from American government circles and covered in journalistic reports by Reuters, the decision to shut down this group resulted from internal processes and a shift in the attitude of Washington’s most influential political center towards events around Ukraine and Russia. Three anonymous U.S. officials confirmed that the structure was formed at the end of spring this year, but by May, it had become demotivated and effectively ceased to function. The reason for this situation was changes in Trump’s stance regarding U.S. policy toward Russia. The sources explain that the president became increasingly disillusioned with the results of his efforts and realized that further support for tough measures against the Kremlin was unfeasible. Even in spring, before the working group's mandate expired, statements emerged about the possibility of the U.S. abandoning its role as a mediator in resolving the Ukrainian conflict. This indicated that the idea of active international diplomacy involving Washington was gradually losing relevance for the Trump administration. According to sources, the final blow to this initiative came from a large-scale “purge” conducted by the White House team three weeks ago. During this purge, most of the members of the National Security Council — including those involved in developing policies related to Ukraine — were dismissed as part of a broad reorganization and personnel cleanup. As a result, the working group, which was coordinated by senior officials of the National Security Council, was closed. Although this department was responsible for its creation and leadership, the group also included representatives from entities such as the State Department, the Treasury, the Pentagon, and intelligence agencies. Among the participants was also the chief advisor of the NSC on Europe and Russia, Andrew Pike, who was also removed from his post in May. However, sources assure that the final decision to close the group was made earlier, approximately three weeks ago, and was not directly influenced by the recent personnel “cleaning.” Moreover, it is quite possible that Trump could return to the idea of a tougher policy towards Moscow at any moment. The working group was formed as a tool for preparing various options and strategies, but the ultimate decision on their implementation remains within the president’s personal discretion. It should be noted that the creation of this group occurred amid a period from March to April when the Trump administration began reviewing its policy towards Russia. At that time, seasoned advisors and analysts expressed doubts about the Kremlin’s willingness to compromise, and Trump’s rhetoric started shifting towards a less friendly stance regarding Vladimir Putin. The main goal of this working group was to discuss ways to restrict Russian supplies, energy resources, and goods to and from Russia, as well as factors that could contribute to increasing economic and political pressure. As for Trump’s personal awareness of the goals and functions of this newly formed structure — the issue remains open. Official representatives refused to comment on the details of the developed initiatives due to their sudden and sensitive nature. At the same time, they confirmed that at the time of the group's closure, it had not yet completed its work and was still in a “brainstorming” stage, which precedes any concrete strategic decisions. It is also possible that this initiative was not directly connected to the sanctions policy, which is adopted separately and independently from internal structural disputes in the U.S. It is worth noting that later, on June 16, Trump made a rather resonant statement that still raises many questions about his attitude towards Russia. He acknowledged that excluding Russia from the G8 format in 2014 was a “big mistake,” and that if Russia had been kept in that forum, the war in Ukraine might not have occurred. At the same time, the U.S. leader pointed out that it is currently unlikely to reinstate Russia as a participant due to the significant amount of time elapsed since its isolation. These words added further confirmation that the political will to intensify pressure on Moscow, despite all statements and loud initiatives, remains highly uncertain. It is also important to consider that at that time, Trump left the G7 summit early, citing “understandable reasons,” where he had intended to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Many interpreted such actions as a sign of reduced interest in active participation in international diplomatic processes against Russia. Thus, the cancellation of the working group is a significant indicator of shifts in the White House’s policy towards Russia and Ukraine. It suggests that the Trump administration currently has no intention of actively promoting tough measures against Moscow and is instead focusing on a more cautious approach or even abandoning previous pressure strategies, which were considered key tools in deepening the Ukraine-Russia conflict. This issue remains open, and future political decisions will depend on internal political conditions and personal calculations within the presidential team.